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A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of 
human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive 
Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and  
De-centralized Cogition, Real-world Robotics and Artificial Life1. Such 
approaches, however, are often criticized for giving certain aspects of rationality 
too wide a berth. They focus their attention on on such superficially poor cousins 
as “adaptive behaviour”, “ecologically sound perception-action routines”, “fast 
and frugal heuristics” and “fast, fluent real-time real-world action control”2.  Is 
this robbery or revelation? Has 'embodied, embedded' cognitive science simply 
lost sight of the very phenomena it was meant to explain? Or are we finally 
seeing rationality aright, as fully continous with various forms of simpler, 
ecologically situated, adaptive response?  
 
I distinguish two ways of developing the 'embodied, embedded' approach. The 
first, which does indeed threaten to lose sight of the key targets, is fully 
committed to a doctrine of biological cognitive incrementalism according to which 
full-scale human rationality is reached, rather directly,  by some series of tweaks 
to basic biological modes of adaptive response. The second depicts  human 
capacities for advanced reason as at best the indirect products of such a process. 
Such capacities, it is argued, depend heavily upon the effects of a special kind of 
hybridization in which human brains enter into an increasingly potent cascade of 
genuinely symbiotic relationships with knowledge-rich artifacts and 
technologies. This latter approach, I finally suggest, does better justice to our 
peculiar profile, which combines deep biological continuity with an equally deep 
cognitive discontinuity. 
 
                                                 
1. For an overview of all these developments, see Clark (1997a) 





1. Introduction: Where the Rubber Meets the Road 
 
 
The changing of the Millenium is a time to sit back, to take stock, to reflect on the 
big picture and to ask ourselves "Where to next?". For philosophes of mind, and 
especially for those of us working within a broadly naturalistic framework, that 
means reflecting on (amongst other things) the shape and scope of scientific 
explanations of human reason. For human rationality, without a doubt, is where 
the rubber meets the road for traditional Cognitive Scientific approaches to 
understanding mind and reason. Putting aside any purely (and problematically) 
normative questions (such as "how ought we to reason?"), philosophers and 
cognitive scientists have found common cause in the attempt to understand how 
such rationality as we in fact display is, as Jerry Fodor likes to put it, 
"mechanically possible" (Fodor (1998) p.204 and elsewhere). 
 
Yet withing the Cognitive Sciences, there stirs a strangeness. Many of the most 
exciting recent research programs give traditional visions of rationality a fairly 
wide berth, focussing their efforts and attention on such superficially poor 
cousins as “adaptive behaviour”, “ecologically sound perception-action 
routines”, “fast and frugal heuristics” and “fast, fluent real-time, real-world 
action control”(see note 2).  Is this robbery or revelation? Has 'embodied, 
embedded' cognitive science simply lost sight of the very phenomena it was 
meant to explain? Or are we finally seeing rationality aright, as fully continous 
with various forms of simpler, ecologically situated, adaptive response?  
 
 I distinguish two ways of developing the 'embodied, embedded' 
approach. The first, which does indeed threaten to lose sight of the key targets, is 
fully committed to a doctrine of biological cognitive incrementalism according to 
which full-scale human rationality is reached, rather directly,  by some series of 
tweaks to basic biological modes of adaptive response. The second depicts  
human capacities for advanced reason as at best the indirect products of such a 
process. Such capacities, it is argued, depend heavily upon the effects of a special 
kind of hybridization in which human brains enter into an increasingly potent 
cascade of genuinely symbiotic relationships with knowledge-rich artifacts and 
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technologies. This latter approach, I finally suggest, does better justice to our 
peculiar profile, which combines deep biological continuity with an equally deep 
cognitive discontinuity. Recognizing and understanding this dual profile, I shall 
argue, is an important step towards reconciling the insights of the traditional and 
the "embodied, embedded" camps. What follows is at best a preliminary sketch 
of this proposed reconciliation. The hope, in line with the millenial brief, is 
simply to display a growing tension, and to scout a few ways to move ahead. 
 
I begin, then, with a brief rehearsal of some twice-told stories about the 
mechanical roots of human reason. 
 
 
2. Mechanical Models of What?3
 
A Jerry Fodor printbite sets the scene. "Beyond any doubt" Fodor lately assures 
us: 
 
the most important thing that has happened in cognitive science 
was Turing’s invention of the notion of mechanical rationality’ 
(Fodor (1998) p.204).  
 
Cognitive science, following through on Turing's vision, is thus to provide us 
with a mechanical model of something variously called “reason” or “rationality” 
or (sometimes) “thinking”.And early work in cognitive science was indeed 
dominated, as Fodor suggests, by a Turing-machine inspired vision of reading, 
writing, and transposing chunky symbols. Typical operations included copying, 
combining, creating and destroying text-like symbols according to instructions. 
Such accounts excelled in explaining how simple, sententially-couched inferences 
might be mechanically reproduced. It explained them by pairing each 
participating thought (as expressed in words) with an inner symbolic echo 
sharing relevant aspects of the structure of the putative thought. Simple syntax-
                                                 
3With apologies to Ian Hacking (The Social Construction of What? , Harvard 




sensitive computational processes could then regulate local inferences in ways 
that marched in step with certain semantic relations between the thoughts - 
truth-preservingness here being the simplest example  (see e.g. Newell and 
Simon (1981), Haugeland (1981, 1997)). It is with this kind of story in mind that 
Fodor goes on to comment that: 
 
Some, at least, of what makes minds rational is their ability to 
perform computations on thoughts; where thoughts, like sentences, 
are assumed to be syntactically structured, and where 
“computations” means formal operations in the manner of Turing. 
(Fodor (1998) p.205). 
 
(The 'some' will later prove important. Fodor, it turns out, is way more 
circumspect concerning exactly what the Turing Machine conception can 
explain than one might sometimes imagine). 
 
 This image of inner symbols in motion has, of course, a famous 
competitor. This is the “connectionist” vision of reason-guided thought 
transitions as grounded in vector-to-vector transformations within a large web of 
simple, parallel computing elements. I shall not attempt a proper discussion of 
this alternative here (but see Clark (1989), (1993) for some attempts). A 
noteworthy point of contrast, however, concerns the “best targets” for each 
approach. For while classical approaches excelled at modelling rational 
inferences that could be displayed in sentential space, connectionist work excelled 
at modelling those dimensions of rationality best conceived of as skill-based. By 
“sentential space” I mean an abstract space populated by meaning-carrying items 
that share the logical form of sentences: sequential strings of content-bearing 
elements in which different syntactic items reliably stand for different things and 
in which the overall meaning is a function of the items and their sequential order. 
By “skill-based dimensions of rationality” I mean the reliable capacity to perform 
“inferences” in which the inputs are, broadly speaking, perceptual and the 
outputs are, broadly speaking, motoric. Examples of the former (sentential-type) 
include the inference from ‘it’s raining’ and ‘I hate getting wet’ to ‘I’d better take 
an umbrella’. Examples of the latter (skill-based) include the cat’s rapid 
assessment of the load bearing capacity of a branch, leading to a swift and 
elegant leap. Of course, inference-making in sentential space can involve 
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perceptual inputs and motoric outputs (such as speech) too. And connectionists 
tend, indeed, to view the sentential inferences as just special cases of their more 
general skill-based vision (see P.M.Churchland 1995). Making an expert medical 
judgement, for the connectionist, has more in common with knowing how to ride 
a bicycle than with consulting a set of rules in a symbolic data-base (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1990)). Reasoning and inference are thus reconstructed, on all levels as 
(roughly speaking) processes of pattern-evolution and pattern-completion 
carried out by cascades of vector-to-vector transformations in parallel 
populations of simple processing units. 
 The most recent waves of work in cognitive science continue this process 
of inner-symbol flight, moving us even further from the traditional shores of 
linguiform reason. Most of this work (as we’ll see more clearly in the next 
section) has very little - or at any rate, very little positive - to say about the 
traditional targets. Instead, we find accounts of the neural control dynamics for 
insect-like robot bodies (Beer (1995)), of the interplay between leg mass and 
spring-like action in the development of infant stepping (Thelen and Smith 
(1994)), of the complex dynamics of co-ordinated finger wiggling (Kelso (1995)), 
of the rich contributions of bodily action and task environments to visual 
processing (Ballard (1991)), and in general - to conclude a potentially much more 
extensive list - of the many and various ways body, brain and world interact so 
as to support fast, fluent responses in ecologically normal settings (see Clark 
(1997a) for a review). So whatever happened to reason, thought and rationality? 
 
 Two things happened, I think. The first is that folk began to doubt the 
centrality of the traditional exemplars of reason, thought and rationality. Take, for 
example, Jerry Fodor’s favourite inference: ‘It’s raining, I don’t want to get wet, 
therefore I shall take my umbrella’ (e.g. Fodor (1987) p.17). Such inferences, 
while perhaps more important in New York than in, say, San Diego, seem 
somewhat less than paradigmatic of the kind of thing upon which survival and 
reproduction most centrally turns. A better bet might be the “inference” from 
‘object looming ever larger in my visual field’ to ‘something is moving very fast 
towards me’ to ‘let’s duck’. But this kind of chain of effect, it has long been clear, 
is generally underwritten by mechanisms whose form and functioning is quite 
unlike those originally described by Turing, and celebrated by Fodor and others. 
A typical story might, for example, associate the ducking response with the 
visually mediated detection of a rather simple perceptual invariant (computed, 
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without any need for shape information, from the raw outputs of directionally 
sensitive cells in two adjacent retinas (see Marr (1982)). Similar kinds of reflex-
like stories account for e.g. the well-timed wing closing of diving birds, such as 
gannets (see Lee and Reddish (1981),  Gibson (1979)). 
 Such stories stand in sharp contrast to ones in which the relevant 
premisses are literally encoded in an inner language, and the inferences 
conducted by well regulated processes of symbol manipulation and 
transformation, terminating in an expression (in that same code) of a possible 
and appropriate action. It is unsurprising, then, that the kinds of capacity and 
behaviour targeted by the most successful “alternative” stories are (intuitively 
speaking) less “cognitive” and more “automatic” than those targeted by many 
traditional accounts: looming-detection, object ducking, walking and wall-
following on the one hand; conversation, story-understanding and means-end 
reasoning on the other4. The possibility thus arises that the two research 
programs are simply talking past each other - appearing to disagree about the 
mechanistic underpinnings of mind while in fact targeting quite different 
dimensions of the same system. But such a comforting diagnosis is too quick. For 
the real point of the alternative accounts is indeed to call into question the worth 
and centrality of many of the traditional exemplars themselves: to call into 
question the idea that the heart of human reason lies in the mechanisms that 
support inferences such as ‘it’s raining, so I’d better take my umbrella’.  
 
 Combined with this doubt about the centrality of the traditional 
exemplars we find a second motivating idea: the idea that to avoid distorting our 
science we should creep up on the high-level, distinctively human kinds of 
thought and reason by a process of incremental investigation which begins by 
targeting much more basic aspects of adaptive response (such as obstacle 
avoidance, predator recognition and so on). This, then, is the second thing that has 
happened to naturalistic investigations of reason, thought and rationality. 
Overall, the new sciences of the mind have become deeply coloured by an 
underlying belief in what I’ll call “biological cognitive incrementalism” - the idea 
that there is a fairly smooth sequence of tweaks and small design innovations 
                                                 
4 These are just examples of course. For a better sense of the range of phenomena 
targeted by this recent work, see Clark (1997a), and for a sense of the more 
traditional targets, see the essays by Minsky, Dreyfus and Newell and Simon, in 
Haugeland (1981). 
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linking full-scale human thought and reason to the mechanisms and strategies 
deployed in more basic, and less intuitively reason-sensitive, cases. 
 These doubts about centrality, and the supporting belief in biological 
cognitive incrementalism, are not, of course, entirely new. Both Daniel Dennett 
and Paul Churchland have, in different ways, long doubted the centrality of the 
kinds of thinking highlighted by traditional accounts (see e.g. Dennett (1982), 
and the comments on page 363 of his (1998), or Churchland’s (1989) (1995) 
marginalization of sentence-like encodings). And David Marr, as long ago as 
1981, was clearly committed to something like the story about cognitive 
incrementalism (see Marr (1981) p.140). What is new, however, is the sheer range 
of tools and models being developed to target these more basic forms of adaptive 
success, the widespread popularity of the project, and the increasingly radical 
theoretical agenda underlying much of the work. It is an agenda which is nicely 
summed up by Godfrey-Smith in his (1996, p320) description of a thesis of 
‘strong continuity’ according to which; 
 
Life and mind have a common abstract pattern or set of basic 
organizational properties. The functional properties characteristic 
of mind are an enriched version of the functional properties that are 
fundamental to life in general. Mind is literally life-like5. 
 
 Connectionism already took one step in this direction, assimilating the 
processes underlying reason to those essential to most forms of skilled adaptive 
response. Recent work in robotics and Artificial Life (see below) takes this 
process several steps further, as we shall now see. 
 
 
2.  Understanding a Robot Cricket 
 
                                                 
5 As far as I can tell, Godfrey-Smith himself remains agnostic on the truth of the 
strong continuity thesis. He merely presents it as one of several possible 
positions and relates it to certain trends in the history of ideas (see Godfrey-
Smith (1996)). 
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 Recent bodies of work in 'embodied, embedded'6  cognitive science 
constitute a quite radical departure from the Turing-Fodor vision, and even - in 
some ways - from the connectionist skill-based vision. In much of this recent 
work, traditional conceptions of thought, reason and action are not so much re-
worked as by-passed entirely. I have discussed many of these developments 
elsewhere (especially  Clark (1997a), (1999)) and must here be content with a 
rather summary sketch. 
 
 Three notable features of the new work are: 
 
1. The attempt to model and understand tightly coupled organism-
environment interaction; 
 
2. An increasing recognition of the role of multiple, locally effective 





3. Attention to various forms of socially, culturally and technologically 
distributed problem-solving allowing the “off-loading” of substantial 
problem-solving activity into the local environment. 
 
 The overall effect of this three-pronged assault has been to re-invent 
rationality as an active, distributed, environment-exploiting achievement. Over-
attention to the first prong has, however, caused some theorists to almost lose 
sight of the traditional targets. Thus, at the most radical end of the spectrum of 
new approaches we find deep scepticism about the important piece of common-
ground shared by classicists and connectionists alike: the vision of rational action 
as involving the deployment and transformation of internal representations. 
 
                                                 
6  The phrase 'embodied, embedded cognitive science' is is due to Haugeland, 
and can be found in the essay reprinted as Haugeland (1998 ) 
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 To get the flavour of this scepticism, consider the humble house-fly. The 
fly, as Marr (1982, p.32-33)7 points out, gets by without needing to know that the 
act of flying requires the flapping of wings. For circuitry running from the fly’s 
feet ensures that, whenever the feet are not in contact with a surface, the wings 
flap. All the fly has to do is jump off the wall, and the flapping will follow. But 
now imagine such dumb circuitry multiplied. Suppose the jump routine is itself 
automatically activated whenever a certain (‘looming shadow indicating’) 
perceptual invariant is detected in the raw visual input. Now let’s go the whole 
hog (or is it the whole Iguana? See Dennett (1978)) and imagine a complete 
creature composed entirely of such routines, all turning each other on and off at 
what are (generally speaking) ecologically appropriate moments. What you have 
imagined is - coarsely but not, I think, too inaccurately - the kind of 
“subsumption architecture” introduced by the roboticist Rodney Brooks and 
discussed in provocatively named papers such as “Intelligence without 
Representation” (Brooks (1991)). 
 
 Brooks himself, it is now apparent, was concerned mainly to avoid (what 
he saw as) the excesses of traditional symbolic approaches. He allows that we 
may choose to treat the states of certain specific circuits, even in a subsumption 
architecture, as 'representing' such-and-such. What we should not do (or not do 
too soon) is to posit a richly expressive inner language, complicated mechanisms 
of search and inference, and an inner economy that trades heavily in messages 
couched in the inner language. The extent of Brooks' opposition to the 
connectionist alternative is less clear and probably depends on the precise details 
of any  broadly connectionist model. Brooks (op cit) does, however, explicitly 
note that the subsumption architecture idea is not just connectionism re-heated, 
but aims  instead for a distinctive, and especially representation-sparse, kind of 
design. 
 
 Or consider Barbara Webb's wonderful work on phonotaxis in a robot 
cricket. Phonotaxis is the process whereby a female cricket identifies a male of 
the same species by his song, turns in his direction, and reliably locomotes to the 
source. On the face of it, this looks to be a complex, three part problem. First, 
                                                 
7 This nice example is reported in McClamrock (1995, p.85). 
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hear various songs and identify the specific song of the male of your own 
species. Second, localize the source of the song. Third, locomote that way 
(making needed corrections en route). This way of posing the problem also 
makes it look as if what the cricket will require to solve the problem are some 
quite general cognitive capacities (to recognize a sound, to discern it's source, to 
plot a route). Nature, however is much thriftier, and has gifted the cricket with a 
single, efficient, but totally special-purpose problem-solving procedure. 
 
 The cricket's ears are on its forelegs and are joined by an inner tracheal 
tube that also opens to the world at two points (called spiracles) on the body. 
External sounds thus arrive at each ear by two routes: directly (sound source to 
ear) and indirectly (via the other ear, spiracles and tracheal tube). These two 
routes take significantly different amounts of time on the side nearest the sound 
source, where the direct route is much quicker than the indirect one. The extra 
time taken to travel through the tube alters the phase of the 'inner route' sound 
relative to the 'outer route' sound on the side (ear) nearest the source. At the 
eardrum these out of phase sound waves are summed, and the resulting 
vibration is heard, by the cricket, as a markedly louder sound on the side nearest 
the source. A dedicated interneuron (one per ear) detects this effect and the 
cricket turns, automatically, in the direction of the source. This whole system 
works only because first, the cricket's tracheal tube is especially designed to 
transmit songs of the species-specific frequency, and because the male song 
repeats, offering frequent bursts each of which powers one of these episodes of 
orienting-and-locomoting (hence allowing course corrections, and longer 
distance mate-finding)- see Webb (1996) for full details. 
 
 In the very specific environmental and bio-mechanical matrix that Webb 
describes, the cricket thus solves the whole (apparently three-part) problem 
using a single special-purpose system. There is no need, for example, to actively 
discriminate the song of your own species, because the specifics of your auditory 
system are structurally incapable of generating the directional response to other 
sounds. Nor, of course, do you bother to build a model of your local 
surroundings so as to plan a route. Instead, you (the cricket) exploit neat tricks, 
heuristics, and features of your body and world. Moreover you (and your real-
world sisters) seem to succeed without relying on anything really worth calling 
internal representations. Webb allows that various inner states do, to be sure, 
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correspond to salient outer parameters, and various inner variables to specific 
motor outputs. But: 
 
It is not necessary to use this symbolic interpretation to explain how the 
system functions: the variables serve a mechanical function in connecting 
sensors to motors, a role epistemologically comparable to the function of 
the gears connecting the motors to the wheels 
Webb (1994), p. 53. 
 
 Understanding the behaviour of the robot cricket requires attention to 
features that, from the standpoint of classical cognitive science, look more like 
details of implementation (the fixed length trachea, the details of ear and spiracle 
placement) and environmental context (the syllable repetition rate of the male) 
than substantive features of an intelligent control system. 
 
 Such work exemplifies the recent focus on tightly-coupled organism-
environment interactions. As such couplings increase in number and complexity, 
the already-thin leverage provided by traditional theoretical notions of 
representation, symbol, and algorithm continues to diminish. Scott Kelso's work 
on rythmic finger motion (Kelso 1995) and Randy Beer's (1995) work on 
cockroach locomotion, for example, each lay great stress on the precise timing of 
specific bio-mechanical events and on the kinds of continuous, circular causal 
chains in which components X and Y (etc) each continually influence, and are 
influenced by, the activity of the other. The theoreretical tools of choice, for 
understanding the behavior of such complex, coupled, temporally-rich systems 
is, many researchers8 now argue, dynamical systems theory. Dynamical systems 
theory is a well-established framework in the physical (not the informational, 
computational or representational) sciences, geared to modeling and describing 
phenomena (including tightly coupled systems) that change over time (for 
discussion, see Clark (1997a, 1997b)).  
 
 Attention to new types of target (tightly coupled organism-environment 
interactions) thus rapidly breeds scepticism concerning the explanatory power of 
                                                 
8 Eg Van Gelder (1995), Thelen and Smith (1994), Kelso (1995), Beer (1995) 
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the old notions (representation, rule-based search etc): a scepticism which is then 
extended to a much wider variety of cases. The suspicion (see e.g. Thelen and 
Smith (1994) Van Gelder (1995), Keijzer (1998)) becomes that symbols, internal 
representations and the like play little role even in advanced human problem-
solving. The trouble with this, as I argue in detail elsewhere (Clark (1997) chapter 
8, Clark and Toribio (1994), Clark (1997b)), is that it is not at all obvious -indeed, 
it seems highly implausible - that truly representation-sparse internal 
architectures can indeed support the kinds of reason-governed, rational 
behaviour characteristic of our species9. Internal representations look prima facie 
essential for such mundane (to us) activities such as dreaming of Paris, mulling 
over U.S.gun control policy, planning next years vacation, counting the windows 
of your New York apartment while on holiday on Rome, and so on. These kinds 
of behaviour are all (to use a term from Clark and Toribio (1994)) 
“representation-hungry”. All these cases, on the face of it, require the brain to use 
internal stand-ins for potentially absent, abstract, or non-existent states of affairs. 
A “stand-in”, in this strong sense is an item designed not just to carry 
information about some state of affairs (in the way that e.g., some inner circuit 
might carry information about the breaking of foot-surface contact in the fly) but 
to allow the system to key its behaviour to features of specific states of affairs 
even in the absence of direct physical connection. (For some excellent discussion of 
the topics of connection and disconnection, see B. C. Smith (1996)). By contrast, 
nearly all10 the cases typically invoked to show representation-free adaptive 
response are cases in which the relevant behaviour is continuously driven by, 
and modified by, ambient input from the states of affairs to which the behaviour 
is keyed. 
 
 I present this, let it be said, not  as any kind of knock-down argument. It is 
still possible that representation-sparse models will account for the full gamut of 
human activity. But the burden of proof remains, surely, with the sceptics. 
Displaying representation-sparse success in domains which were not 
representation-hungry in the first place cannot count as much of a strike against 
representationalism.  
                                                 
9 The debate is complicated, of course, by the absence of an agreed account of 
just when some inner state should properly count as a representation. See Clark 
(1997b), Clark and Grush (1999) for a proposal 
10 But see Stein (1994), Beer (2000) and discussion in Clark (1999) 
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 There are two other elements, however, in the embodied, embedded 
world-view which may ultimately (or so I believe) prove to be of more general 
importance. One is the emphasis on simple heuristics. There is a growing body of 
recent work (see especially Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group ( 
1999)) that displays the remarkable efficacy of special-purpose routines and 
heuristics even in 'advanced' human problem-solving. Such procedures, the 
authors show, can often be shown to perform as well (or sometimes better) as 
more traditionally 'rational' and knowledge-intensive procedures. Indeed, 
Gigerenzer et al dispute the idea that the use of (what they call) 'fast and frugal 
heuristics' amounts to some kind of failure of rationality and instead depict such 
strategies as the heart and soul of 'ecological rationality'. Thus although there is a 
long tradition in A.I and psychology (such as the 'heursitics-and-biases program- 
see Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) of studying 'quick-and-dirty' short-cuts, the 
new research does so in a rather different spirit: 
 
 Whereas the heuristics-and-biases program portrays heuristics as a 
frequent  hindrance to sound reasoning, rendering Homo sapiens not so 
sapient, we see  fast and frugal heuristics as enabling us to make reasonable 
decisions and  behave adaptively in our environment- Homo sapiens would 
be lost without  them 
  Gigerenzer et al (1999) p.29 
 
What makes these fast and frugal heuristics work, the authors note, is primarily 
the way they enable the mind to make maximal use of 'the structure of 
information in the environment' (op cit p.28). Gigerenzer et al note, towards the 
end of the book, that recent work in robotics (they cite Brooks especially) can be 
seen as operating in much the same spirit. This can be seen quite clearly, I think, 
in the specific example of cricket phonotaxis discussed above. But whereas 
Brooks and others are suspicious of the very idea of mental inference and 
internal model-building, Gigerenzer et al simply seek to display such activities as 
computationally tractable and as rather tightly geared to specific structures of 
information and opportunity in the local problem-solving environment. The 
second prong of the embodied, embedded approach thus shades into the third: 
the exploitation of various aspects of the environment as integral parts of the 
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problem-solving engine. It is this third prong, however, on which I shall now 
concentrate. Before doing so, however, let's pause to take stock. 
 
 We began with the Turing-Fodor vision of reading, writing and 
transposing inner, language-like symbols. We touched briefly on the delights of 
connectionist vector coding as a skill-based alternative to the classical vision. 
Connectionism, we might say, taught us how to trade in internal representations 
without the use of fully-fledged, text-like inner symbols. And we ended by 
reviewing recent work in robotics, artificial life and dynamical systems theory: 
work which targets the complexities of real-world, real-time organism-
environment interactions. This work is, in many ways, the natural culmination of 
the process (a kind of 'inner symbol flight' -see Clark (in Press)) which the 
connectionists began.  
 
 But what exactly  does this work have to  teach us about full-scale human 
rationality? Does it simply miss this target altogether? Is the embodied, 
environmentally embedded approach to cognitive science robbery or revelation? 
It is robbery, I suggested, if the lesson is meant to be that we can now dispense 
with the ideas of internal representation and model-building altogether. But it 
may be revelation if instead it draws attention to the many, complex and 
underappreciated ways in which minds make the most of the environments they 
inhabit and (in our case) repeatedly design and build. 
 
3. World, Technology and Reason 
 
 Much of advanced cognition, I believe, depends on the operation of the 
same basic kinds of capacity used for on-line, adaptive response, but tuned and 
applied to the very special domain of external and/or artificial cognitive aids – the 
domain, as I shall say, of cognitive technology. This idea takes its cue from Dennett 
(1995) (1996), Hutchins (1995), Kirsh and Maglio (1994) and many others. The 
central idea is that understanding what is distinctive about human thought and 
reason may turn out to depend on a much broader focus than that to which 
cognitive science has become most accustomed: a focus that includes not just 
body, brain and the natural world, but the technological props, aids and 
scaffoldings (pens, papers, PC’s, institutions...) in which our biological brains 
learn, mature and operate. 
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 Work on simpler systems such as the robot cricket already draws our 
attention to the complex ways in which neural and non-neural (in this case 
bodily and environmental) factors and forces may combine to render complex 
problems computationally tractable. The most promising route for 
understanding and modelling human-level intelligence, I suggest, is to take quite 
seriously the idea of complex internal representations (though their form may be 
connectionist rather than classical) but to combine this with a special emphasis 
on the peculier ways in which human thought and reason is sculpted, 
enhanced,and ultimately transformed, by our interactions with the rather special 
environments we create. 
 
 That we humans benefit deeply from the empowering presence of non-
biological props and scaffolds is, I suppose, indisputable. But we are often blind 
to the sheer variety, heterogeneity and depth of the non-biological contributions. 
We tend, mistakenly, to view the main role of these non-biological systems as 
that of providing more (and more durable, and shareable) memory. The real 
contribution of the props and aids is, however, more like the provision of brand-
new computer functionality by the insertion of a PC card than the simple 
provision of more memory or new storage media. 
 
 Thus consider two brief examples: one old (see Clark (1997a) Epilogue) 
and one new. The old one first. Take the familiar process of writing an academic 
paper. Confronted, at last, with the shiny finished product the good materialist 
may find herself congratulating her brain on its good work. But this is 
misleading. It is misleading not simply because (as usual) most of the ideas were 
not our own anyway, but because the structure, form and flow of the final 
product often depends heavily on the complex ways the brain co-operates with, 
and depends on, various special features of the media and technologies with 
which it continually interacts. We tend to think of our biological brains as the 
point source of the whole final content. But if we look a little more closely what 
we may often find is that the biological brain participated in some potent and 
iterated loops through the cognitive technological environment. We began, 
perhaps,  by looking over some old notes, then turned to some original sources. 
As we read, our brain generated a few fragmentary, on-the-spot responses which 
were duly stored as  marks on the page, or in the margins. This cycle repeats, 
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pausing to loop back to the original plans and sketches, amending them in the 
same fragmentary, on-the-spot fashion. This whole process of critiquing, re-
arranging ,streamlining and linking is deeply informed by quite specific 
properties of the external media, which allow the sequence of simple reactions to 
become organized and grow (hopefully) into something like an argument. The 
brain's role is crucial and special. But it is not the whole story. In fact, the true 
(fast and frugal!) power and beauty of the brain's role is that it acts as a 
mediating factor in a variety of complex and iterated processes which continually 
loop between brain, body and technological environment. And it is this larger 
system which solves the problem. We thus confront the cognitive equivalent of 
Dawkins' (1982) vision of the extended phenotype. The intelligent process just is 




 Or consider, to take a superficially very different kind of case, the role of 
sketching in certain processes of artistic creation.  Van Leeuwen, Verstijnen and 
Hekkert (1999) offer a careful account of the creation of certain forms of abstract 
art, depicting such creation as heavily dependent upon “an interactive process of 
imagining, sketching and evaluating [then re-sketching, re-evaluating, etc.] " (op 
cit p. 180).  The question the authors pursue is: why the need to sketch?  Why not 
simply imagine the final artwork “in the mind’s eye” and then execute it directly 
on the canvas?  The answer they develop, in great detail and using multiple real 
case-studies, is that human thought is constrained, in mental imagery, in some 
very specific ways in which it is not constrained during on-line perception.  In 
particular, our mental images seem to be more interpretively fixed: less able to 
reveal novel forms and components.  Suggestive evidence for such constraints 
includes the intriguing demonstration (Chambers and Reisberg (1989)) that it is 
much harder to discover (for the first time) the second interpretation of an 
ambiguous figure (such as the duck/rabbit) in recall and imagination than when 
confronted with a real drawing. Good imagers, who proved unable to discover a 
second interpretation in the mind's eye, were able nonetheless to draw what they 
had seen from memory and, by then perceptually inspecting their own unaided 
drawing, to find the second interpretation. Certain forms of abstract art, Van 
Leeuwen et al go on to argue, likewise, depend heavily on the deliberate creation 
of “multi-layered meanings” – cases where a visual form, on continued 
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inspection, supports multiple different structural interpretations.  Given the 
postulated constraints on mental imagery, it is likely that the discovery of such 
multiply interpretable forms will depend heavily on the kind of trial and error 
process in which we first sketch and then perceptually (not merely 
imaginatively) re-encounter visual forms, which we can then tweak and re-
sketch so as to create a product that supports an increasingly multi-layered set of 
structural interpretations. This description of artistic creativity is strikingly 
similar, it seems to me, to our story about academic creativity. The sketch-pad is 
not just a convenience for the artist, nor simply a kind of external memory or 
durable medium for the storage of particular ideas.  Instead, the iterated process 
of externalizing and re-perceiving is integral to the process of artistic cognition 
itself.  
 
 One useful way to understand the cognitive role of many of our self-
created cognitive technologies is thus as affording complementary  operations to 
those that come most naturally to biological brains.  Recall the connectionist 
image of biological brains as pattern-completing engines.  Such devices are adept 
at linking patterns of current sensory input with associated information: you 
hear the first bars of the song and recall the rest, you see the rat’s tail and conjure 
the image of the rat.  Computational engines of that broad class prove extremely 
good at tasks such as sensori-motor co-ordination, face recognition, voice 
recognition, etc.  But they are not well-suited to deductive logic, planning, and 
the typical tasks of sequential reason. They are, roughly speaking, “Good at 
Frisbee, Bad at Logic” – a cognitive profile that is at once familiar and alien.  
Familiar, because human intelligence clearly has something of that flavor.  Yet 
alien, because we repeatedly transcend these limits, planning family vacations, 
running economies, solving complex sequential problems, etc., etc. A powerful 
hypothesis, which I first encountered in McClelland, Rumelhart, Smolensky and 
Hinton (1986), is that we transcend these limits, in large part, by combining the 
internal operation of a connectionist, pattern-completing device with a variety of 
external operations and tools which serve to reduce various complex, sequential 
problems to an ordered set of simpler pattern-completing operations of the kind 
our brains are most comfortable with.  Thus, to borrow the classic illustration, we 
may tackle the problem of long multiplication by using pen, paper and numerical 
symbols.  We then engage in a process of external symbol manipulations and 
storage so as to reduce the complex problem to a sequence of simple pattern-
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completing steps that we already command, first multiplying 9 by 7 and storing 
the result on paper, then 9 by 6, and so on.The value of the use of pen, paper, and 
number symbols is thus that – in the words of Ed Hutchins; 
 
 [Such tools] permit the [users] to do the tasks that need to be done while 
doing  the kinds of things people are good at: recognizing patterns, modeling 
simple  dynamics of the world, and manipulating objects in the 
environment. 
       Hutchins (1995) p. 155 
 
This description nicely captures what is best about good examples of cognitive 
technology: recent word-processing packages, web browsers, mouse and icon 
systems, etc. (It also suggests, of course, what is wrong with many of our first 
attempts at creating such tools – the skills needed to use those environments 
(early VCR’s, word-processors, etc.) were precisely those that biological brains 
find hardest to support, such as the recall and execution of long, essentially 
arbitrary, sequences of operations.  See Norman (1999) for discussion. 
 
 
 The conjecture, then, is that one large jump or discontinuity in human 
cognitive evolution involves the distinctive way human brains repeatedly create 
and exploit various species of cognitive technology so as to expand and re-shape 
the space of human reason.  We – more than any other creature on the planet – 
deploy non-biological elements (instruments, media, notations) to complement 
our basic biological modes of processing, creating extended cognitive systems 
whose computational and problem-solving profiles are quire different from those 
of the naked brain. 
 
 The true significance of recent work on “embodied, embedded” problem-
solving may thus lie not in the endless debates over the use or abuse of notions 
like internal representation, but in the careful depiction of complex, looping, 
multi-layered interactions between the brain, the body and reliable features of 
the local problem-solving environment. Internal representations will, almost 
certainly, feature in this story. But so will external representations, and artifacts, 
and problem-transforming tricks. The right way to “scale-up” the lessons of 
simple robotics so as to illuminate human thought and reason is  to recognise 
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that human brains maintain an intricate cognitive dance with an ecologically 
novel, and immensely empowering, environment: the world of symbols, media, 
formalisms, texts, speech, instruments and culture. The computational circuitry 
of human cognition flows both within and beyond the head, through this 
extended network in ways which radically transform the space of human 
thought and reason. Modelling and understanding this environmentally extended 
cognitive device is an important task for any mechanistic account of human 
rationality. 
 
4. Puzzles For Cyborgs. 
 
 Advanced human reason, according to the story just developed, is an 
essentially extended achievement. The nexus of resources that make our kind of 
rationality mechanically possible far outrun the resources of the individual 
biological brain, and include essential roles for non-biological props and artifacts, 
including external symbol systems. It’s the props, tools and add-ons, according 
to this story (and the wider webs of encoding and processing in which they 
figure) that make us so special: that enable humans, more than any other animal 
on the planet, to glimpse and explore the spaces of reason. 
 
 This kind of story, with its general emphasis on the role of tools and 
equipment, clearly has roots both in Heidegger (1927/1961) and in the work of 
John Haugeland (e.g Haugeland (1998)). But it is probably most strongly 
associated, in the philosophical literature, with the work of Daniel Dennett (see 
especially Dennett (1995) (1996)).  
 
 One difference between Dennett’s story and the kind of account suggested 
in section 3 above lies in their differing emphases on internalisation. The primary 
impact of the surrounding cognitive technologies lies, for Dennett, is the way 
exposure to them (especially to speech, which Dennett contentiously treats as a 
special kind of cognitive technology) “re-programs” the biological brain, 
allowing it to internalise routines and strategies first explored in some external 
arena. Thus we read that experience with the use of linguistic labels, inherited 
from our culture, sculpts individual brains in the ways distinctive of 
conceptualised understanding. Concepts (human-style concepts) are thus 
explained as ‘artifactual modes in our memories...pale shadows of articulated 
 21
and heard words’ (Dennett (1996) p.151). While I am not inclined to doubt that 
experience with words and labels adds a new dimension to human thought (see 
e.g. The discussion in Clark (1998)), I have tended (following Ed Hutchins- see 
Hutchins (1995)) to emphasise a somewhat different range of cases: cases in 
which processes of development and learning culminate not in the full 
internalisation of a (once) technologically-mediated competence, but in a kind of 
dove-tailed distributed machine. Thus recall the case of the painter whose creative 
activity involves a process of sketching and re-sketching. Or the architect whose 
design activity involves the use of CAD and virtual reality. Or the academic who 
carefully lays out her argument on paper for re-inspection and tweaking. Or the 
sailor who uses charts, alidades, nautical slide rules and the like (Hutchins 
(1995)). In all these cases - and the list is endless - the result of learning and 
development is not so much to internalise a once-external strategy, but to gear 
internal resources to play a specific role in a reliable, extended problem-solving 
matrix.  
 
 Now all this, I readily concede, is just a matter of emphasis. For something 
like full internalisation clearly can occur, and (contrariwise) Dennett also accepts 
the important role of what I have been calling “dovetailing”. Thus Dennett even 
comments that: 
 
The primary source [of our greater intelligence]...is our habit of off-
loading as much as possible of our cognitive tasks into the 
environment itself - extending our minds (that is, our mental 
projects and activities) into the surrounding world. (Dennett (1996) 
p.135). 
 
Nonetheless, I think it is fair to say that, in general, Clark and  Hutchins depict 
the primary role of cognitive technologies as expanding our effective cognitive 
architecture so as to include circuits and transformations that loop out into the 
surrounding environment, while Dennett has attended most closely to the 
developmental  dimension in which external props sculpt and transform what is 
ultimately an internal resource.  
 
 The former image (of human cognitive architectures as literally extending 
outside the head) gives rise, however, to a number of questions and puzzles. A 
 22
common initial reaction is to ask How, if it is indeed all these designer 
environments that make us so smart, we were ever smart enough to build them 
in the first place? Such a question can be pressed in two quite different ways, 
requiring quite different kinds of response. The simplest formulation offers a 
(meetable) challenge: How can our designer environments be what makes us so 
smart, if we had to be that smart in order to build them in the first place? Thus 
formulated, there is a familiar (and correct) response: bootstrapping. On the 
bootstrapping scenario, you use the intelligence available to create a resource 
that makes more intelligence available, and repeat until satisfied (or extinct).  
 
 A better way to pose the question, however, is this: since no other species 
on the planet builds as varied, complex and open-ended designer environments 
as we do (the claim, after all, is that this is why we are special), what is it that 
allowed this process to get off the ground in our species in such a spectacular 
way? And isn't that, whatever it is, what really matters?  Otherwise put, even if 
it’s the designer environments that makes us so intelligent, what biological 
difference lets us build/discover/use them in the first place? 
 
 This is a serious, important and largely unresolved question. Clearly, 
there must be some (perhaps quite small) biological difference that lets us get our 
collective foot in the designer environment door - what can it be? The story I 
currently favour located the difference in a biological innovation for greater 
neural plasticity combined with the extended period of protected learning called 
“childhood” Thus Quartz (1999) and Quartz and Sejnowski (1997) present strong 
evidence for a vision of human cortex (especially the most evolutionarily recent 
structures such as neocortex and prefrontal cortex) as an “organ of plasticity” 
whose role is to dovetail the learner to encountered structures and regularities, 
and to allow the brain to make the most of reliable external problem-solving 
resources. This “neural constructivist” vision depicts neural (especially cortical) 
growth as experience - dependent, and as involving the actual construction of 
new neural circuitry (synapses, axons, dendrites) rather than just the fine-tuning 
of circuitry whose basic shape and form is already determined. One upshot is 
that the learning device itself changes as a result of organism-environmental 
interactions - learning does not just alter the knowledge base for a fixed 
computational engine, it alters the internal computational architecture itself. 
Evidence for this neural constructivist view comes primarily from recent 
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neuroscientific studies (especially work in developmental cognitive 
neuroscience). Key studies here include work involving cortical transplants, in 
which chunks of visual cortex were grafted into other cortical locations (such as 
somatosensory or auditory cortex) and proved plastic enough to develop the 
response characteristics appropriate to the new location (see Schlagger and 
O’Leary (1991)), work showing the deep dependence of specific cortical response 
characteristics on developmental interactions between parts of cortex and 
specific kinds of input signal (Chenn, (1997) and a growing body of constructivist 
work in Artificial Neural Networks: connectionist networks in which the 
architecture (number of units and layers, etc.) itself alters as learning progresses - 
see e.g. Quartz and Sejnowski (1997). The take home message is that immature 
cortex is surprisingly homogeneous, and that it ‘requires afferent input, both 
intrinsically generated and environmentally determined, for its regional 
specialisation’ (Quartz (1999) p.49).  
 
 So great, in fact, is the plasticity of immature cortex (and especially, 
according to Quartz and Sejnowski, that of prefrontal cortex) that O'Leary dubs it 
'proto-cortex'. The linguistic and technological environment in which the brain 
grows and develops is thus poised to function as the anchor point around which 
such flexible neural resources adapt and fit. Such neural plasticity is, of course, 
not restricted to the human species (in fact, some of the early work on cortical 
transplants was performed on rats) , though our brains do look to be far and 
away the most plastic of them all. Combined with this plasticity, however, we 
benefit from a unique kind of developmental space- the unusually protracted 
human childhood. 
 
 In a recent evolutionary account which comports perfectly with the neural 
constructivist vision, Griffiths and Stotz (2000) argue that the long human 
childhood provides a unique window of opportunity in which "cultural 
scaffolding [can] change the dynamics of the cognitive system in a way that 
opens up new cognitive possibilities" (op cit p.11) These authors argue against 
what they nicely describe as the "dualist account of human biology and human 
culture" according to which biological evolution must first create the 
"anatomically modern human" and is then followed by the long and ongoing 
process of cultural evolution. Such a picture, they suggest, invites us to believe in 
something like a basic biological human nature, gradually co-opted and 
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obscured by the trappings and effects of culture and society. But this vision 
(which is perhaps not so far removed from that found in some of the more 
excessive versions of evolutionary psychology) is akin, they argue, to looking for 
the true nature of the ant by "removing the distorting influence of the nest" (op 
cit p.10). Instead we humans are, by nature, products of a complex and 
heterogenous developmental matrix in which culture, technology and biology 
are pretty well inextricably intermingled. The upshot, in their own words, is that: 
 
The individual representational system is part of a larger 
representational environment which extends far beyond the skin. 
Cognitive processes actually involve as components what are more 
traditionally conceived as the expressions of thought and the 
objects of thought. Situated cognition takes place within complex 
social structures which ‘scaffold’ the individual by means of 
artifactual, linguistic and institutional devices...[and]..culture 




  In short it is a mistake to posit a biologically fixed “human nature” 
with a simple “wrap-around” of tools and culture. For the tools and culture are 
indeed as much determiners of our nature as products of it. Ours are (by nature) 
unusually plastic brains whose biologically proper functioning has always 
involved the recruitment and exploitation of non-biological props and scaffolds. 
More so than any other creature on the planet, we humans are natural-born 
cyborgs, factory tweaked and primed so as to participate in cognitive and 
computational architectures whose bounds far exceed those of skin and skull.  
 
 All this adds interesting complexity to recent evolutionary psychological 
accounts (see eg Pinker (1997)) which emphasize our ancestral environments. For 
we must now take into account a plastic evolutionary overlay which yields a 
constantly moving target, an extended cognitive architecture whose constancy 
lies mainly in its continual openness to change. For the more specific doctrine of 
biological cognitive incrementalism, the implications are even more unsettling. 
Even granting that the underlying biological innovations may have required just 
a small tweak to some ancestral repertoire, the upshot of this subtle alteration is 
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now a sudden, massive leap in cognitive-architectural space. For the cognitive 
machinery is now intrinsically geared to self-transformation, artifact-based 
expansion, and a snowballing/bootstrapping process of computational growth. 
The machinery of human reason (the environmentally extended apparatus of our 
distinctively human intelligence) turns out to be rooted in a biologically 
incremental progression while simultaneously existing on the far side of a 
precipitous cliff in cognitive-architectural space.  
 Other problems that may arise include fears concerning the fate, given 
some such story, of traditional conceptions of agency, responsibility and 
personhood. One problem, which can present itself as an attempted reductio of 
the whole 'extended mind' idea, concerns the threat of “mental bloat”. The worry 
(discussed at greater length in Clark and Chalmers (1998)) is that allowing (to use 
our new example) the sketch-pad operations to count as part of the artist’s own 
mental processes leads inevitably to absurdities such as counting the database of 
the dusty Encyclopedia Britannica, which I keep in my garage, as part of my 
general knowledge. Such intuitively pernicious extension is not, however, 
inevitable. It is quite proper, as we argue in Clark and Chalmers (1998), to restrict 
the props and aids which can count as part of my  mental machinery to those that 
are, at the very least, reliably available when needed and used or accessed pretty 
much as automatically as biological processing and memory. But despite such 
concessions, the idea of the biological organism as the privileged locus of 
personhood, agency and responsibility dies hard. Thus Butler (1998) suggests 
that the ultimate locus of control and decision-making is always the biological 
brain. It might also be argued that extensions and dovetailing aside there is 
always a “core agent” identical with the biological self, that conscious thought 
must always supervene on only the biological aspects of any extended nexus, 
and that the biological machinery displays a kind of co-ordination and 
integration missing (or usually missing) in cases of organism-artifact problem-
solving. 
 Let us grant, for the sake of argument, some kind of biological-
individualistic restriction concerning the substrate of conscious thought. That 
costs us nothing, since no one, I suppose, identifies the agent or the person solely 
with the biological machinery that supports  conscious thought. Yet all the other 
arguments, it seems to me, are prone to a single type of response viz: that 
reapplying each suggested criteria internally reveals it as both implausible and 
unprincipled. Let us ask, for example, whether my hippocampus participates in 
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ultimate decision-making? If it does not, are we to assume that the sub-personal 
hippocampal machinery is not part of the cognitive system that constitutes 
Andy-the-agent? Or suppose, as is not entirely out of the question, that there 
simply are no neural structures that reliably and constantly form the inner locus 
of “ultimate decision-making”: that decisions emerge from the co-occurrence 
activity of many shifting coalitions of sub-systems. Once again, religious 
adherence to the suggested critirion would seem to lead to a kind of shrinkage in 
which the true cognitive agent is either identified with an unrealistically small 
sub-set of neural structures, or to an even more unnerving total disappearance, in 
which everything now appears external to some imaginary internal point source 
of genuine agency, control and will. Parallel arguments are easily constructed to 
show that strong notions of “core agency”, “types of informational integration” 
and the like threaten, once re-applied inside the biological skin-bag, , to 
undermine the very notion (of  the biological brain as the true engine of reason 
and the seat of personhood) they were supposed to protect. 
 Herbert Simon, in fact, was led to embrace just this kind of cognitive 
shrinkage, and for some quite revealing reasons. Simon saw, very clearly, that 
portions of the external world often functioned as a non-biological kind of 
memory. He thus saw the deep parity (parity, not identity) that can obtain 
between external and internal resources. But instead of counting those external 
(biological-organism-external) resources as proper parts of an extended knowing 
system, Simon chose to go the other way. Regarding biological, on-board 
memory, Simon chose to ‘view this information-packed memory as less a part of 
the organism than of the environment to which it adapts’ (Simon (1981) p.65). 
Part of the problem here no doubt originates from Simon’s overly passive (mere 
storage) view of biological memory. But a deeper issue concerns the underlying 
image of something like a “core agent” surrounded by mere (internal and 
external) support systems (memories, etc.). It is this image which we must 
simply give up, if we are to preserve any substantial notion of the cognitive self. 
For the core, once we go searching for it, always turns out to be something thin 
and disappointing: in Simon’s case, something not unlike the CPU of the 
traditional computer, or even the read-write head of the Turing machine! 
 
 A more promising approach, for the fans of biological individualism, 
might be to focus on providing a positive account of the value of a self-
conception (an understanding of our own identity and personhood) which 
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continues to give pride of place to the contents of the ancient skin-bag. I doubt 
that such a positive account will be forthcoming. But the debate concerning 
biological/non-biological conceptions of the self is clearly far from over (it has, 
after all,  been running ever since Locke (xxxx): for a nice overview, and a 
spirited defence of a non-biological conception, see Rovane (1998)).  
 
 Let us return, finally, to some questions closer to those with which we 
began: questions concerning the mechanical explanation of human reason itself. 
It is useful, with our previous discussion in mind, to notice that the kinds of 
reasoning and rationality philosophy has (at least in the present century) 
typically set out to explain and understand were, in fact, originally situated, and 
often socially distributed, achievements. Thus consider Ed Hutchins’ revealing 
account of the kind of reasoning which the Turing machine model (see section 1 
above) was originally supposed to capture. It was a model, Hutchins (and see 
Dennett (1991) chapter 7, Clark (1989) chapter 6) suggests, not ,in the first 
instance, of what goes on inside the individual head, but of the kinds of serial, 
symbol-matching problem-solving that we engage in using pen, paper and other 
external props and artifacts. The original inspiration was nothing other than the 
self-conscious process of breaking a problem into parts, applying rules, 
inscribing the results, and repeating the procedure again and again (see also 
Dennett (1991) p.212). In such cases: 
 
The mathematician or logician was visually and manually 
interacting with [symbols and artifacts in] the material world. 
[Since] the symbols are in the environment...the cognitive 
properties of the human are not the same as the cognitive 
properties of the system that is made up of the human in 
interaction with these symbols. (Hutchins (1995) p.361). 
 
 The image of serial, clunky, symbol manipulation as the deep explanation 
of the mechanical possibility of reason is thus plausibly taken as a repressed 
image of the distributed mechanisms of environmentally situated reason, rather than 
as a revealing image of the operation of the inner-biological aspects of that 
extended system. It is at precisely this point, I suggest, that the germs of truth in 
both the classicist and the connectionist visions of mechanical reason can be 
reconciled. For the connectionist has the better grip on the contribution of the 
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brain, while the classicist nicely captures certain features of some larger systems 
comprising brains, artifacts and external symbols. The lofty vantage point of 
situated reason provides the proper perch from which to view this old debate.  
 
 Further issues which bear signposting include the pressing need for an 
account of the features of an extended brain-artifact system which make it 
(hopefully) epistemologically sound: the features which allow such an extended 
organization to be truth-seeking and (hopefully) often truth-revealing. We here 
require an account of the distinctive roles, and interactive complexities, of the 
various (biological, social, artifactual) parts of such a distributed system, and of 
the conditions under which it can be understood as yielding knowledge. We 
need an account of what it is for a theory, idea or belief generated by such a 
distributed and heterogenous process to be reliable and/or justified. And we 
need (I suspect) an account personal responsibility and moral agency which 
respects the thin, de-centralized and distributed nature of situated intelligent 
control. None of this, I think, presents an intractable problem. But the required 
moral and cognitive epistemology (the epistemology of distributed and situated 
reason) does not yet exist. Its closest cousin is work in the philosophy and 
methodology of science. But overall, these are indeed philosophical projects  for a 
new millenium. 
 
 Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, Jerry Fodor (1994, lecture 4) lately shows 
himself not unsympathetic to a fairly close relative of this project. Fodor too is 
darkly suspicious of the vision of full cognitive incrementalism, commenting that 
‘only the most benighted of evolutionary gradualists could be sanguine that the 
apparently radical discontinuity between us and other creatures will prove to be 
merely quantitative’ (op cit p.91). He thus embraces the project of discerning just 
what it is that is special about our own minds (op cit). And what is special, Fodor 
argues, is that we (alone) are typically aware of the contents of our own 
thoughts. But what matters most, it then seems, is not this initial skill so much as 
the subsequent snowball of designer-environment creation to which it gives rise. 
For such self-awareness, Fodor suggests, enables a creature: 
 
to construct, with malice aforethought, situations in which it will be 
caused to have the thought that P if and only if the thought is true. 
(Fodor (1994) p.92). 
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 Awareness of the contents of our own thoughts, Fodor suggests, enables 
us to engage in repeated and cumulative exercises of cognitive self-management 
and, ultimately, ‘ to bootstrap our science’ (op cit p.98). We design our worlds so 
that they cause us to believe more truths, which enables us to design newer and 
better worlds, which cause us to believe even more truths, and so on. This, for 
Fodor, is another key part of the story about how we manage to be ‘largely 
rational creatures’ (op cit p.102).11  
Fodor thus offers an intriguingly different account of the underlying biological 
difference, but likewise stresses the power and potency of the subsequent 
cascade of designer environments. 
 Despite our many differences then, there is a surprising amount of 
common ground here emerging. For the most distinctive features of human 
reason, even Fodor seems willing to agree, depend not directly on the brute 
profile of the biological brain but on the larger, designer-environment involving, 
systems in which such brains now develop, operate and learn. A proper scientific 
model of human thought and reason thus requires serious, not merely 
peripheral, attention to the properties of the multiple larger scale structures in 
which human brains are so productively embedded: the spots where the 
biological rubber meets the purpose-built road. 
 
 
4. Conclusions: Rationality at a Crossroads 
 
The project of explaining how distinctively human kinds of thought and reason 
are mechanically possible is easily misconstrued. It is misconstrued as the project 
of understanding what is special about the human brain. No doubt there is 
something special about our brains. But understanding our peculiar profiles as 
reasoners, thinkers and knowers of our worlds requires an even broader 
perspective: one that targets multiple brains and bodies operating in specially 
constructed environments replete with artifacts, external symbols, and all the 
variegated scaffoldings of science, art and culture. Understanding what is 
                                                 
11 Interestingly, Daniel Dennett has lately joined Fodor in this, stressing the 
importance of what he calls ‘florid representing’ - the self-aware use and 
deployment of representations, both internal and external. See Dennett (ms). 
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distinctive about human reason thus involves understanding the complementary 
contributions of both biology and (broadly speaking) technology, as well as the 
dense, reciprocal patterns of causal and co-evolutionary influence that run 
between them.  
 
For us humans there is nothing quite so natural as to be bio-technological 
hybrids: cyborgs of an unassuming stripe. For we benefit from extended 
cognitive architectures comprising biological and non-biological elements, 
delicately intertwined. We are hybrids who occupy a region of design space 
radically different from those of our biological forbearers. It is for this reason that 
we should be wary of the apparently innocent and “naturalistic sounding” 
doctrine I have called “biological cognitive incrementalism”. 
 
Where, then, does this leave the reputedly fundamental question ‘How is 
rationality mechanically possible?’. It leaves it, I think, at an important 
crossroads, uncertainly poised between the old and the new. For if the broad 
picture scouted above is even halfway correct, the full problem of explaining 
rationality becomes, precisely, the problem of explaining the production, in 
social, environmental, and technological context12, of broadly appropriate 
adaptive response. Rationality (or as much of it as we humans typically enjoy) is 
what you get when this whole medley of factors are tuned and interanimated in 
a certain way. Figuring out this complex ecological balancing act just is figuring 
out how rationality is mechanically possible. 
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